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Why is the struggle against corrup-tion in Indonesia so difficult?
What are the main mechanisms for its
intensifying proliferation? Who are the
principal beneficiaries and cost bearers?
What role can Indonesian civil society
play in overcoming the growing threat
of KKN? Can Indonesia escape the KKN
trap, which threatens to create a future
of poverty and turmoil?
Corruption is central to understanding
the failure of Indonesia’s new rulers to
deliver meaningful reform, well-found-
ed prosperity or a measure of social jus-
tice. In the late Suharto period the coun-
try was widely thought of as a
kleptocracy, with one extended family
figuring as kleptocrats-in-chief. Since
Suharto’s ‘fall’ (which has been much
exaggerated) and the advent of a ‘Refor-
masi’ (which has fully qualified for its
inverted commas), we have a democra-
tised – or at least oligopolised – and
decentralized version of Suharto-era
KKN. 
The crony conglomerates, both Chinese
and pribumi (indigenous Indonesian),
and their ‘in-house’ banks have survived
the crash of the currency, the crash of
the banks, the crash of export-led growth
and the rise of poverty. Persisting, per-
vasive corruption has permitted most of
them to weather default, bankruptcy,
bank restructuring and asset sell-offs.
They have preserved their business
empires in the face of complete finan-
cial and economic disaster for the state
and the people. And they have resorted
once again to the tried and trusted
mechanisms and networks of KKN to
spectacular effect.
How did things go so 
wrong so quickly?
Or we might ask: How did it all go so
right for the cronies and their threat-
ened business empires? As Robison
and Hadiz have shown, the refinancing
of the bankrupt banks following the
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 was
long on carrot but short on stick.
Almost all of the International Mone-
tary Fund’s $14 billion, distributed
through the Bank Indonesia liquidity
support fund (BLBI) to rescue and
reflate Indonesia’s private banks, was
promptly embezzled by the corporate
cronies who controlled them.1 The
banks lent the money ‘in-house’
whence it disappeared, mainly into off-
shore investments and debt repay-
ment.
The court actions intended to recover this
money were another sorry illustration of
the failings of the Indonesian legal sys-
tem in the reform process. Case after
case collapsed under the influence of
flawed judicial reasoning and action. The
IMF, the bountiful source of this new
instant debt mountain that was supposed
to rescue the economy, watched aston-
ished (though why should it have been?)
and censorious – but ultimately power-
less – from the sidelines.
Seven years on from the IMF ‘rescue’
Indonesia is essentially still prostrate
and now doubly crucified by the gnomes
of Washington and Wall Street. In the
Suharto years the World Bank’s tolera-
tion of a steady haemorrhage of 30% or
so of its own development loan funding
to KKN2 left a $10 billion public debt
overhang at the moment of crash in
1997. The fresh multibillion dollar fias-
co of the IMF rescue package has now
saddled the long-suffering Indonesian
public with an additional debt of sever-
al billion dollars.
Jeffrey Winters has suggested that there
should be international criminal
accountability for the former debt
mountain; it seems there should be
moral-political accountability at least for
the latter one, since the IMF saw fit to
lend once again into a rotten structure.
There is also the issue of domestic
Indonesian accountability, which was
submerged in the rush to money poli-
tics under Suharto’s successor and polit-
ical crony, President Jusuf Habibie.
Habibie pioneered his way on the back
of the Golkar Party’s attempted looting
of Bank Bali3 and by bilking the poverty
alleviation fund of Bulog (Badan Uru-
san Logistik, the national logistics
agency)4 to assure funding for the 1999
election.
The Suharto-era cronies were joined in
resuming the plunder of the Indone-
sian interior (to borrow a phrase from
Marx) by a widening circle of senior
bureaucrats, state industry sector exec-
utives, judges, prosecutors, court offi-
cials, police and military generals
(many retired) and politicians and party
officials. Then, as decentralisation
reforms took hold from 2001, officials
in the provinces and regencies, both
bureaucratic and elected, joined the
KKN club, colluding with local busi-
nessmen and operating even without
the centralised restraints of Suharto’s
dictatorship. This has gravely sabotaged
the potential of special and regional
(ordinary) autonomy to deliver long-
delayed economic justice or a sense of
effective local participation in the
aggrieved provinces of Aceh and Papua
and elsewhere.5
To protect and swindle 
Thus money politics in parliaments was
complemented by money justice, klep-
tocratic state administration and TNI
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or armed
forces) capitalism, corruption and extor-
tion. New government-established insti-
tutions to combat corruption have pro-
liferated since 1998 – most notably an
Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK,
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) and
Court – while anti-corruption NGOs
from Transparency International to TNI
Watch are active and articulate. But
despite backing from mass print media,
notably the Tempo group, Indonesian
civil society remains embattled, strug-
gling for real empowerment in the anti-
corruption campaign. 
A principal reason for this is the
impunity of the military and military-
dominated sectors of the government in
their violent dealing with civil society
opponents who seek to expose and
undermine the military business
empire, which includes illegal logging
and log export,6 and fuel smuggling and
theft on a vast scale in collusion with cor-
rupt officials at the state oil and gas com-
pany, Pertamina (Pertambangan Minjak
dan Gas Bumi Nasional).7 TNI and the
police also routinely extend protection
to big business associates who them-
selves employ violence and intimidation
in defence of corrupt empires. 
TNI remains a prime guarantor of
Suharto family wealth, which became
clear when Tommy Suharto spent a year
on the run in Jakarta under military
protection after procuring the murder
of the judge who sentenced him to
prison on corruption charges in 2001.8
Meanwhile, retired military generals at
BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, the State
Intelligence Agency) were plainly
involved in the poisoning-murder of the
founder of Kontras (Komisi Untuk
Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kek-
erasan, Commission for Disappear-
ances and Victims of Violence) and
leading the scourge of the TNI, Munir,
in 2004. Only the BIN field operative
Garuda pilot, Pollycarpus, has been
brought to trial for the killing.9
In Indonesia corruption thrives under
the influence of a large and still growing
business, political, administrative and
military elite who are prepared to
unscrupulously wield state authority
and state violence – as well as private
violence under state or military protec-
tion – to defend their interests. Tackling
KKN effectively depends on far-ranging
reforms that must go well beyond the
window-dressing of Reformasi.  Bitter
political struggles over corruption
undoubtedly lie ahead. <
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Experts and most Indonesians agree that since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Reformasi and Demokratisasi have failed to check
corruption, commonly referred to as KKN: Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme. The new government of President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono has made the fight against KKN its chief priority, but the results so far have been disappointing.
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